No. This paper investigates the relationship between nancing constraints and investment-cash ow sensitivities by analyzing the rms identi ed by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen as having unusually high investment-cash ow sensitivities. We nd that rms that appear less nancially constrained exhibit signi cantly greater sensitivities than rms that appear more nancially constrained. We nd this pattern for the entire sample period, subperiods, and individual years. These results (and simple theoretical arguments) suggest that higher sensitivities cannot be interpreted as evidence that rms are more nancially constrained. These ndings call into question the interpretation of most previous research that uses this methodology.
cash ow sensitivities of the different subsamples. The studies interpret a greater investment-cash ow sensitivity for rms considered more likely to face a larger wedge between the internal and the external cost of funds as evidence that the rms are indeed constrained. This methodology has been widely applied to identify rms that are more affected by nancing constraints, and institutions that are more likely to alleviate those constraints. For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [1991] nd that investment by Japanese rms that belong to a keiretsu (corporate group) is less sensitive to cash ow than investment by independent rms. They conclude that a group (and concomitant bank) af liation alleviates underinvestment problems caused by capital market imperfections.
Despite the size and policy-importance of this literature, the fundamental assumptions underlying it have remained largely unexplored. While subsequent work has replicated the ndings of FHP [1988] by using different a priori criteria, no paper (of which we are aware) has veri ed directly whether a higher investment-cash ow sensitivity is related to nancing problems and, if it is, in what way. In particular, there is no test of the fundamental assumption-implicit in all these tests-that investment-cash ow sensitivities increase monotonically with the degree of nancing constraints. As we show in Section I, this is particularly surprising because there is no strong theoretical reason to expect a monotonic relationship. This paper investigates the relation between investmentcash ow sensitivities and nancing constraints by undertaking an in-depth analysis of a sample of rms exhibiting an unusually high sensitivity of investment to cash ow. These rms are the 49 low dividend rms that FHP [1988] identify as nancially constrained according to the investment-cash ow criterion.
By using detailed and previously unexplored data sources, we try to determine the availability of and the demand for funds for each of the sample rms. We examine each rm's annual report or 10-K for each sample year, and we read management's discussion of liquidity that describes the rm's future needs for funds and the sources it plans to use to meet those needs. We integrate this information with quantitative data and with public news to derive as complete a picture as possible of the availability of internal and external funds for each rm as well as each rm's demand for funds. On this basis we rank the extent to which the sample rms are nancially constrained each year. We use the rm-year classi cations to group the sample rms over seven-or eight-year subperiods, and over the entire sample period. Finally, we compare investment-cash ow sensitivities across the different groups of rms for the entire sample period, for subperiods, and for individual years.
Surprisingly, we nd that in only 15 percent of rm-years is there some question as to a rm's ability to access internal or external funds to increase investment. In 85 percent of rm-years the rms could have increased their investment-in many cases, substantially-if they had so chosen. In fact, almost 40 percent of the sample rms, including Hewlett-Packard (cited above), could have increased their investment in every year of the sample period. Our partially qualitative measures of nancial constraints are strongly corroborated by quantitive data on debt to total capital, interest coverage, the presence of restrictions on dividends, and nancial slack (the level of cash and unused line of credit relative to investment).
More strikingly, those rms classi ed as less nancially constrained exhibit a signi cantly greater investment-cash ow sensitivity than those rms classi ed as more nancially constrained. We nd this pattern for the entire sample period, for subperiods, and for individual years. This pattern is also robust to different criteria to divide constrained and unconstrained rms. For example, rms with healthy interest coverage in every sample year or in every subperiod year have investment-cash ow sensitivities twice as large as the remaining rms in the sample.
As we explain in Section I, these results should not be very surprising. There is no strong theoretical reason for investmentcash ow sensitivities to increase monotonically with the degree of nancing constraints. Nevertheless, we consider several possible reasons why estimated investment-cash ow sensitivities could decrease in the degree of nancing constraints even if the true relationship is increasing.
First, cash ow may act as a proxy for investment opportunities not captured by Tobin's Q and do so differentially across rms. Our results, however, are robust to the use of an Euler equation test [Bond and Meghir 1994] , which does not rely on Tobin's Q and thus is not affected by its mismeasurement. Second, differences in sensitivities might be driven by a few in uential outliers. We nd evidence that the high overall sensitivity of our sample (FHP's [1988] low dividend payout rms) rela-tive to FHP's higher dividend payout rms is explained by a relatively few company-years characterized by exceptionally high sales growth. We also nd, however, that these outliers do not explain our cross-section results that the least constrained rms have the highest sensitivities.
Third, our nding of nonmonotonic relationship may be speci c to a few distressed rms that are forced to use cash ow to repay their debt, and may not apply to more "normal" samples. The nancial conditions of the constrained rms, though, are not consistent with this hypothesis.
In sum, we provide both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that a greater sensitivity of investment to cash ow is not a reliable measure of the differential cost between internal and external nance. In so doing, we address (and refute) the criticisms in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen [1996] [FHP 1996] .
We conclude the paper with a discussion of the generality of our results. We argue that our analysis calls into question the interpretation of most previous research that uses this methodology.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the theoretical framework. Section II describes the sample. Section III explains the criteria used to identify the extent to which rms are nancially constrained. Section IV reports the investment-cash ow regression results. Section V discusses the results and considers alternative explanations for them. Section VI discusses the implications and generality of our results for the previous literature. Section VII concludes.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. De nition of Financing Constraints
In order to discuss the relationship between investment-cash ow sensitivity and the degree of nancing constraints, we must de ne what it means to be nancially constrained. The most precise (but also broadest) de nition classi es rms as nancially constrained if they face a wedge between the internal and external costs of funds. By this de nition all rms are likely to be classi ed as constrained. A small transaction cost of raising external funds would be suf cient to put a rm into this category. This de nition, however, provides a useful framework to differentiate rms according to the extent to which they are nancially con-strained. A rm is considered more nancially constrained as the wedge between its internal and external cost of funds increases. Our classi cation scheme, which we detail below, is designed to distinguish the relative differences in the degree to which rms are nancially constrained. In general, our unconstrained or less constrained rms are those rms with relatively large amounts of liquid assets and net worth.
In classifying rms, we are agnostic on whether the wedge between the cost of internal and external funds is caused by hidden information problems, as in Myers and Majluf [1984] and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss [1984] ; or agency problems, as in Jensen and Meckling [1976] , Grossman and Hart [1982] , Jensen [1986] , Stulz [1990] , and Hart and Moore [1995] . In fact, unlike Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [1994] , the purpose of our analysis is not to identify the source of the capital market imperfection, but rather to understand the effects capital market imperfections have on investment. We next review what economic theory has to say about the impact of nancing constraints on investment. FHP [1988] was the rst of many papers to consider higher investment-cash ow sensitivities as evidence of greater nancing constraints. Given the magnitude and the importance of this literature, it is surprising that little attention has been given to the theoretical foundation of the investment-cash ow sensitivity criterion.
B. The Impact of Financing Constraints on Investments
1 While it is easy to show that constrained rms should be sensitive to internal cash ow while unconstrained rms should not, it is not necessarily true that the magnitude of the sensitivity increases in the degree of nancing constraints. This is the crucial question, given that investment is sensitive to cash ow for the vast majority of rms analyzed. (It is easy to justify this sensitivity based on the fact that external funds are more costly than internal funds for all rms as long as some transaction costs are involved.)
The dif culty of interpreting cross-sectional differences in investment-cash ow sensitivities can be illustrated with a simple one-period model. Consider a rm that chooses the level of investment to maximize pro ts. The return to an investment, I, is given by a production function F(I ), where F 9 . and F 0 , 0.
Investment can be nanced either with internal funds (W) or with external funds (E). The opportunity cost of internal funds equals the cost of capital, R, which, for simplicity, we set equal to 1. Because of information, agency, or risk aversion problems, we assume that the use of external funds generates a deadweight cost, which-in a competitive capital market-is borne by the issuing rm. We represent (in reduced form) this additional cost of external funds with the function C (E,k) , where E is the amount of external funds raised and k is a measure of a rm's wedge between the internal and the external costs of funds. It is natural to assume that the total cost of raising external funds increases in the amount of funds raised and in the extent of the agency or information problems (represented by k). All the a priori measures of nancing constraints used in the literature can be thought of as different proxies for k (which is unobservable) or of W (the availability of internal funds).
Each rm, then, chooses I to maximize,
To guarantee that the above program is well behaved, we also assume that C(.) is convex in E.
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The rst-order condition of problem (1), then, is given by
where C 1 (0) represents the partial derivative of C with respect to its rst argument and F 1 () the rst derivative of F with respect to I. The effects of the availability of internal nance on investments can be easily obtained by implicit differentiation of (2):
which is clearly positive (to the extent that C is convex). In other words, in an imperfect capital market world, investments are sensitive to internal funds; while in a perfect capital market world, they are not (because C(.) 5 0 and thus C 11 5 0). Similarly, it is possible to derive the sensitivity of investment to the wedge between the cost of internal and external nancing. By implicit differentiation of (2) we obtain 2. This is a reasonable, but not obvious assumption. For example, Calomiris and Himmelberg [1995] document that the average transaction cost of issuing securities decreases in the amount raised, which suggests that C() may be concave. While these transaction costs may be only a small component of the overall cost C(.), we note that this basic assumption might not be warranted.
which is negative if the marginal cost of raising external nance is increasing in k (i.e., C 12 . 0). Most papers in this literature, however, do not test either of these two propositions. On the one hand, the estimated investment-cash ow sensitivity is generally positive and signicant for all rms, suggesting that all rms are constrained in some sense, and so, making the test of the rst implication redundant. Second, most of the proxies for W or k used in the literature are only able to identify constrained rms, not constrained rmyears. This makes it impossible to disentangle the effect ofnancing constraints from a rm-speci c effect on the level of investment.
For these reasons, previous papers focus on cross-sectional differences in the investment-cash-ow sensitivity across groups of rms likely to have a different wedge between internal and external funds. But this corresponds to looking at differences in dI/dW as a function of W or k. 
If both C 11 () and F 11 () are different from zero, we can rewrite equation (5) as 
Given that the second term is always positive, it follows that d 2 I/ dW 2 is negative if and only if [F 111 /F 11 2 2 C 111 /C 11 2 ] is negative. This condition implies a certain relationship between the curvature of the production function and the curvature of the cost function at the optimal level of investment. It is easy to see how such a condition can be violated. For example, if the cost function is quadratic, d
2 I/dW 2 will be positive if the third derivative of the production function is positive (as is the case with a simple production function like I r , where 0 , r , 1). In such a case the investment-cash ow sensitivity increases with a rm's internal liquidity. Of course, many simple production functions have positive third derivatives. Although we will not produce them here, the conditions necessary to ensure that d 2 I/dWdk be positive are at least as demanding.
In sum, even in a one-period model, investment-cash ow sensitivities do not necessarily increase with the degree of nancing constraints. In a multiperiod model, precautionary savings motives make it even more dif cult to assess the theoretical relationship between investment-cash ow sensitivities and the degree of nancing constraints. For example, Gross [1995] builds and simulates an intertemporal investment model and nds a nonmonotonic relationship between investment-cash ow sensitivities and the extent of nancing constraints.
Finally, the relationship between investment-cash ow sensitivities and degree of nancing constraints can be further complicated by the presence of irrational or overly risk-averse managers, who choose to rely primarily on internal cash ow to invest despite the availability of low cost funds.
II. SAMPLE
In this paper we analyze the sample of 49 low-dividend paying rms in FHP [1988] . FHP divide all manufacturing rms in the Value Line database with uninterrupted data from 1970 to 1984 into three classes based on dividend payout policy. Their 49 Class 1 rms (which we analyze) have a dividend payout ratio of less than 10 percent in at least ten of the fteen years. FHP classify 39 rms that have a dividend payout ratio between 10 percent and 20 percent as Class 2 rms, and all 334 other rms in their sample as Class 3 rms. FHP argue that the Class 1 rms are more likely, a priori, to have been nancially constrained. In their analysis they nd that the Class 1 rms have an investment-cash ow sensitivity that is signi cantly greater than that for rms that pay higher dividends.
We choose this sample for three reasons. First, these rms exhibit a strong relation between investment and cash ow. Second, FHP argue strongly that these rms are nancially constrained, most likely because of information problems. Because FHP [1988] can legitimately be considered the parent of all papers in this literature, there can be no disagreement that we have adversely selected our sample. Finally, given the high cost of our research design, the number of rms is manageable.
We follow this sample for the same fteen years, 1970 to 1984, studied by FHP [1988] . For each rm we collected data from several sources. First, we collected letters to shareholders, management discussions of operations and liquidity (when available), nancial statements, and the notes to those statements from the annual report or 10-K for each rm-year. We obtained Wall Street Journal Index entries over the fteen-year sample period. 3 We obtained standard accounting variables from COMPU-STAT except those for Coleco which we obtained from Coleco's annual reports. Because FHP obtained their data from Value Line not COMPUSTAT, our data are not precisely the same as theirs.
We measure investment or capital expenditures using COMPUSTAT item 128. We measure cash ow as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (item 18) and depreciation (item 14). We de ate investment and cash ow by capital which we measure as net property, plant, and equipment (item 8) at the beginning of the scal year. This measure of capital differs slightly from the replacement cost measure employed by FHP.
We measure average Tobin's Q as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (item 6) where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). As do most papers in this literature, we calculate Q at the beginning of a rm's scal year. 4 (Our results are similar when we use endof-period Q.)
In Table I we compare the basic regression results for our sample with those reported in Table 4 of FHP [1988] . These regressions regress investment on cash ow and Q, and control for xed rm and year effects. Our results are qualitatively similar to those reported by FHP, although they differ slightly in some details.
5 For each of the three time periods, our coef cients on cash ow are lower than those reported by FHP. Those differ-3. Fiscal years ending before June 15 are assigned to the previous calendar year; scal years ending after June 15 are assigned to the current calendar year.
4. Our measure differs from FHP's in two ways. First, FHP compute Q based on replacement costs, while we simply use a market-to-book ratio. The results in Perfect and Wiles [1994] indicate that the improvements obtained from the more involved computation of Q are fairly limited, particularly when regressions are estimated with rm xed effects. Second, FHP use the average market value of equity in the fourth quarter while we use the actual market value of equity at scal year end. 5. We use 719 observations, not 735, because rms switched scal years (three rm-years), rms did not le nancial statements with the SEC (six rmyears), and rms did not have an available stock price (seven rm-years). FHP [1988] do not report how many observations they include. 
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ences, however, appear to be only marginally signi cant, if at all. At the same time, our coef cients for Q are signi cantly greater than those reported by FHP. We attribute the differences between our results and FHP's to the different de nitions of Q. When we exclude Q from our regressions, we obtain coef cients on cash ow that exceed those in FHP except for the 1970-1975 period where our coef cient is insigni cantly smaller. Because the FHP measure is constructed with an average stock price in the previous year rather than the (more appropriate) stock price at the beginning of the year, we suspect that our measure of Q provides better information about investment opportunities. The FHP measure will not distinguish between a rm whose stock price declines from 20 to 10 and a rm whose stock price increases from 10 to 20 at the end of the previous year.
6
III. CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
A. Description
The SEC requires companies listed on a stock exchange that have more than 500 shareholders and $5 million in assets to le an annual report or 10-K that contains the basic nancial statements and their notes, as well as all material information regarding a company's business and nancial condition. The annual reports are generally introduced by a letter to shareholders from the chief executive of cer (CEO). This letter usually describes the major events of the previous scal year and the major projects planned for the future.
In 1977 the SEC strengthened these reporting requirements by adopting Regulation S-K, which requires rms to discuss explicitly their liquidity, capital resources, and results of operations. This section is usually titled management's discussion of operations. Item 303 of Regulation S-K states:
(1) Liquidity. Identify any known trends or any known demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties that will result in . . . the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way. 6. FHP [1996] question our measure of Q as a possible source of error because we use book value rather than replacement value of assets. This concern is unfounded for two reasons. First, our measure of Q explains more variation in investment than the measure used by FHP, suggesting that their measure is noisier than ours. Second, as we show below, we obtain similar results using an Euler equation approach that does not rely on Q.
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITIES
If a material de ciency is identi ed, indicate the course of action that the registrant has taken or proposes to take to remedy the de ciency. Also identify and separately describe internal and external sources of liquidity, and brie y discuss any material unused sources of liquid assets.
(2) Capital Resources. (i) Describe the registrant's material commitments for capital expenditures as of the end of the latest scal period, and indicate the general purpose of such commitments and the anticipated source of funds needed to ful ll such commitments . . . (ii) Describe any known material trends, favorable or unfavorable in the registrant's capital resources. Indicate any expected material changes in the mix and the relative cost of such resources.
Instructions: 5. The term "liquidity" . . . refers to the ability of an enterprise to generate adequate amounts of cash to meet the enterprise's needs for cash. . . . Liquidity shall generally be discussed on both a long-term and short-term basis.
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In short, Regulation S-K explicitly requires rms to disclose whether or not they are having dif culty in nancing their investments. Consistent with the timing of the new SEC regulations, post-1977 annual report information for our sample rms tends to be more detailed than the information for earlier years. To the extent that our classi cation scheme has errors, they should be smaller for years after 1977.
We use the qualitative information in the annual reports, together with quantitative information in the companies' nancial statements and notes, to classify each rm-year into one of ve groups.
The rst group contains rms that we deem de nitely not nancially constrained in that year. We refer to these rm-years as not nancially constrained (NFC). We place a rm-year in the NFC group if the rm initiated or increased cash dividends, repurchased stock, or explicitly indicated in its annual report that the rm had more liquidity than it would need for investment in the foreseeable future. 8 We also were more likely to label a rmyear NFC if the rm had a large cash position (relative to investment) or if the rm's lenders did not restrict the rm from making 7. See SEC 63031 in Murray, Decker, and Dittmar [1993] . 8. For example, Plantronics' 1971 annual report states: "We ended the year in an exceptionally strong nancial condition for a company of our size. During the year we paid off all long-term debt, and our cash and cash-equivalent assets have throughout the year exceeded all current liabilities." large dividend payments (relative to investment). NFC rmyears, therefore, tend to include nancially healthy companies with low debt and high cash. In NFC rm-years, therefore, we nd no evidence that the rms could not have invested appreciably more if their managers had so chosen. In NFC rm-years, rms also have large amounts of internal funds and collateralizable resources relative to the amount of funds required.
The second group includes rm-years that we label likely not to be nancially constrained (LNFC). In LNFC rm-years the rms are healthy nancially and do not give any indication of being liquidity constrained. These rms also tend to have sizable cash reserves, unused lines of credit, and healthy interest coverage. We distinguish LNFC rm-years from NFC rm-years by the magnitude of the liquidity measures and by the absence of an explicit statement of excess liquidity. Again, in LNFC rm-years we nd no evidence that these rms could not have invested more if their managers had so chosen. For example, despite the quote in our introduction, we classify Hewlett-Packard as LNFC in ve rm-years in the 1970s. The third group includes rm-years we found dif cult to classify either as nancially constrained or as unconstrained. We call these rm-years possibly nancially constrained (PFC). In PFC rm-years, rms do not report any clear signs of nancing constraints, but they do not look particularly liquid either. Frequently these rms face an adverse product market environment, but are not explicitly strapped for cash. This category also includes rm-years that provide contradictory indications of their nancial situation. For example, this might include a company that increases its dividend, but laments its lack of nancial resources in the letter to shareholders.
The fourth group contains all rm-years in which rms are likely to be nancially constrained (LFC). This group includes rms that mention having dif culties in obtaining nancing. For example, we include rm-years in which rms postpone an equity or convertible debt offering due to adverse market conditions, or claim they need equity capital but are waiting for improved market conditions. Generally, these rms are prevented from paying dividends and have little cash available. Firms that cut dividends also are more likely to fall in this category, unless other adverse factors assign them to the fth group.
The last group includes all rm-years in which rms are undoubtedly nancially constrained (FC). In these rm-years, these companies are in violation of debt covenants, have been cut out of their usual source of credit, are renegotiating debt payments, or declare that they are forced to reduce investments because of liquidity problems.
Our classi cation scheme is subject to the criticism that managers do not always report truthfully, and, therefore, some rm-years will be misclassi ed. We do not view management misreporting as a serious problem for several reasons. First, managers are held liable not only for disclosing false information, but also for not disclosing material information. This is particularly true after 1977 when Regulation S-K is in effect.
9 Second, we read annual reports over a fteen-year period. While a rm may be able to misreport in any given rm-year, it seems unlikely that a rm can misreport every year. Third, we do not rely exclusively on the management discussions, but also read the nancial statements carefully. Finally, any management reluctance to report negative information should bias our results against ndingnancially constrained companies and differences across groups. To the extent that we nd some companies to be nancially constrained, we can be certain that they are indeed constrained.
Overall, our classi cation scheme captures relative differences in sample rms' availability of internal and external funds in a given year. The nancial statements and management discussions strongly indicate that NFC (and LNFC) rms could have invested more (often substantially more) in that year had they so chosen. In the language of our model, these are rms for whom W is very high even after they invest. Therefore, these rms should face a C(E,k) that is close to 0, if not equal to 0. This is unlikely to be true for the PFC rms, and de nitely not true for the LFC and FC rms. Our classi cation scheme, therefore, captures relative differences in sample rms' wedge between external and internal nance.
B. Classi cation Results
Table II summarizes our classi cation of rm-years. We classify 54.5 percent of rm-years as not (NFC) and 30.9 percent of rm-years as likely not nancially constrained (LNFC) for a total of 85.3 percent of rm-years in which we nd no evidence of nancing constraints that restrict investment. We classify 7.3 percent 9. For example, the SEC took action against Caterpillar, Inc. for not reporting that a large increase in Caterpillar's 1989 net income was caused by a hyperin ation in Brazil. of rm-years as possibly constrained, 4.8 percent as likely constrained, and 2.6 percent as de nitely constrained for a total of only 14.7 percent rm-years in which there is some possibility of nancing constraints. The fraction of rms that are at least possibly constrained, varies over time, with more rms being potentially constrained in the early part of the sample (when these rms were smaller), and particularly around the 1974-1975 recession. This time pattern is consistent with the results in FHP [1988] and in Table I that investment-cash ow sensitivities decline over the sample period. (In the Appendix we report the yearby-year classi cations for all 49 rms.)
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We consider the accuracy of our classi cation scheme by reporting quantitative measures of operational and nancial health across our ve classi cations in Table III . In panel A, median cash ow, net cash ow (cash ow less investment), and Tobin's Q decline monotonically across the ve categories. For example, the median level of net cash ow for NFC rms is 11 percent of capital (net property, plant, and equipment) while the median level of net cash ow for FC rms is almost 2 20 percent. This suggests that NFC rms could have increased their investment without tapping external sources of capital.
Panel A also suggests that our classi cation scheme is successful in capturing the degree of nancing constraints. Equation (3) predicts that investment will decline as nancing constraints increase. Consistent with this, the median level of investment is signi cantly lower for LFC and FC rm-years than for the other three groups. (We test this more formally in subsection IV.C, where we control for investment opportunities.) Furthermore, the mean level of investment in acquisitions (as a fraction of capital) is substantially higher for rms in the rst two groups (NFC and LNFC) than for rms in the other three groups.
10 Acquisitions are completely absent in FC rm-years.
Panel B reports summary statistics on rm nancial status. Interest coverage-earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, or EBITDA (COMPUSTAT item 13) to interest expense (item 15)-declines monotonically across our classi cations.
11 Debt to total capital also decreases monotonically: debt is 10. We calculate acquisitions as the value of businesses or companies acquired in a given rm-year as a fraction of beginning-of-year capital. We value purchase acquisitions using information in the statement of changes. We value pooling acquisitions using the notes to nancial statements.
11. We set interest coverage to 100 if coverage exceeds 100 or interest expense is negative. We set interest coverage to 0 if EBITDA is negative. nancially constrained (PFC), likely nancially constrained (LFC), and nancially constrained (FC). Each entry reports the median, mean, tenth percentile, ninetieth percentile, and number of observations. Investment (I t ), cash ow Q, and capital (K t2 1 ) are de ned in Table  I . Acquisitions (Acqs.) equals the value of purchase and pooling acquisitions. Interest coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA) to interest expense. Debt is the sum of the book value short-term and long-term debt. Total capital is the sum of debt, the book value of preferred stock, and the book value of common equity. Free divs. is the amount of retained earnings that are not restricted from being paid out as dividends. Cash is cash and marketable securities. Unused line t is the amount of unused line of credit at the end of year t. Slack is the sum of cash and unused line. Change in debt is the change in sum of the book value of short-term and long-term debt. Equity issue is the sum of the equity issued to the public and to acquisition targets. the sum of the book value of short-term and long-term debt (items 9 and 34), while total capital is the sum of debt, the book value of preferred stock, and the book value of common equity. It is worth pointing out that NFC rm-years have a large median interest coverage of almost eight times while the LNFC rm-years have a median coverage of almost six. In contrast, the median coverage in LFC rm-years is less than three times and in FC rm-years barely exceeds one.
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITIES
The notes to the nancial statements typically state whether a rm's debt covenants, if any, restrict a rm from paying dividends. We interpret a rm as being more nancially constrained the greater the restrictions placed on dividend payments by covenants. Table III reports that the fraction of rm-years in which debt covenants forbid the payment of dividends increases monotonically across our classi cations. NFC rm-years are restricted 6.1 percent of the time, while LFC and FC rms are restricted more than 68 percent of the time.
In the majority of rm-years the notes to nancial statements also report exactly how much of retained earnings are free for dividend payments under the strictest debt covenants.
12 Panel B of Table III indicates that this amount falls monotonically across our ve groups. In NFC rm-years the median amount of earnings free for dividends equals 20.8 percent of beginning-ofyear capital and almost 58 percent of the year's investment. In other words, the median NFC rm could have paid out a dividend equal to 58 percent of its capital expenditures without the permission of existing lenders.
Finally, cash (COMPUSTAT item 1), unused line of credit, and slack (the sum of cash and unused line of credit) all decline monotonically across our classi cations. Slack provides a measure of the amount of funds or liquidity immediately available to a rm at year-end. Slack may overstate true liquidity slightly because some rms were required to maintain compensating balances. That quali cation notwithstanding, the median slack in NFC rm-years is 72.5 percent of beginning-of-year capital and 191 percent of the year's investment. In LNFC rm-years the analogous amounts are 42 percent and 119 percent.
As an additional check, we estimate ordered logit models of the probability that a rm falls in one of the ve categories: with NFC being the lowest state and FC the highest. The results are presented in Table IV . The likelihood of being classi ed as nancially constrained is signi cantly greater in rms with higher debt to total capital, higher Q, and for whom dividend payments are forbidden. The likelihood is signi cantly lower in rms with high cash ow, high cash, high dividends paid, high retained earnings free for dividends, and with any unused line of credit at 12. This information is not reported in years that a rm has no debt as well as some of the earlier rm-years. all. All the coef cients are statistically signi cant at the 1 percent level, and all the coef cients except perhaps the one on Q have the expected sign. Q has a positive impact on the probability of being nancially constrained. This is true despite the univariate result in Table III that Q decreases with rm nancial health. The likely explanation for this result is Q's partial correlation with cash ow. In the absence of cash ow, the coef cient on Q becomes negative. One way to interpret this result is that con-ditional on having a low cash ow, we classify a rm as more likely to be constrained if it has more investment opportunities (high Q). Overall, we feel that the monotonic patterns of most of the operating and nancial variables in Table III and the results in  Table IV provide a strong quantitative validation of our classication scheme.
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C. Overall Financial Status
In order to analyze investment-cash ow sensitivities over fteen years, we aggregate each rm's annual nancial status into an overall measure of nancial status. We refer to this as sample nancial status (rather than rm-year nancial status). We distinguish rms that were never nancially constrained from those that were. We do this to account for the likelihood that rms which become constrained will behave as if they are constrained.
Our classi cation provides a great deal of variation. Nineteen rms are never constrained: they are classi ed as NFC or LNFC in all fteen sample years. These rms never showed any sign of being nancially constrained over the entire period. Eight rms are possibly constrained. These rms were possibly constrained in at least one year and not constrained (NFC and LNFC) in all the rest. Finally, 22 rms are likely constrained. These rms were classi ed as LFC or FC in at least one sample year.
We also aggregate annual nancial status into overall status over two subperiods: 1970 to 1977 and 1978 to 1984 . We classify rms according to whether they were likely constrained, possibly constrained, or not constrained within each subperiod. We do this for four reasons. First, the classi cation over the entire sample period will classify a rm as nancially constrained even if that rm was constrained in only one of fteen years. By measuring nancial status over subperiods, we increase the precision of our classi cations. Second, the research design in FHP biases the sample toward companies that were small in 1970, but were established enough by 1984 to be included in the Value Line data set. Therefore, a rm in the earlier part of the sample is conceivably different from the same rm later on. Third, as noted earlier, the information contained in the management discussions and footnotes of annual reports improves after 1977. Therefore, we believe that the precision of our classi cations increases in the QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS second subperiod. Finally, as noted earlier, FHP [1988] report that the sensitivity of investment to cash ow is particularly strong in the rst half of the sample, when these rms were smaller and more likely to have been nancially constrained.
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS
Armed with a direct measure of a rm's nancially constrained status, we can now test whether the worsening of nancing constraints is associated with a monotonic increase in investment-cash ow sensitivity (as would occur if d 2 I/dW 2 were negative).
A. Financing Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities
We rst examine the relationship between nancing constraints and investment-cash ow sensitivities by following the FHP methodology and estimating separate regressions by rm sample nancial status. We use the regression speci cations presented in Table I over the entire sample period. Table V presents our basic results. Firms classi ed as never constrained (NFC or LNFC in every sample year) exhibit the highest investment-cash ow sensitivity (0.702), exceeding that for the entire sample (0.395), for rms that were likely constrained (0.340), and for rms that were possibly constrained (0.180). The coef cient for the never constrained rms is economically and statistically greater than the coef cients for the other rms.
As we noted earlier, we are not entirely comfortable with the classi cation of possibly constrained rms. If managers tend to underreport negative information about their rm's nancial condition, then it would be appropriate to group the eight possibly constrained rms with the likely constrained rms. Not surprisingly, this grouping lowers the coef cient on constrained rms to 0.250, and widens the gap between constrained rms and unconstrained rms. It is worth pointing out that the 0.250 sensitivity is insigni cantly different from that of the high-dividend FHP Class 3 rms and actually smaller than that of the FHP Class 2 rms.
Alternatively, it is possible that we have been excessively conservative and have classi ed rms as possibly constrained when they were, in fact, unconstrained. Accordingly, we also estimate a regression in which we group the possibly constrained Table I . Regressions are estimated for total sample and by nancially constrained status where 19 rms are never nancially constrained over the entire period (NFC or LNFC in every year), 8 rms are possibly nancially constrained at some time (PFC in some year), and 22 rms are likely nancially constrained at some time in the period (LFC or FC). Overall status is based on rm nancing constraint status for each year of not nancially constrained (NFC), likely not nancially constrained (LNFC), possibly nancially constrained (PFC), likely nancially constrained (LFC), and nancially constrained (FC). All regressions include rm xed effects and year effects. Standard errors are in brackets. rms with the never constrained rms. While this lowers the investment-cash ow sensitivity substantially (to 0.439), it does not alter the basic result that unconstrained rms exhibit a greater investment-cash ow sensitivity.
In Tables VI and VII, we Table VI , therefore, include 98 rm-subperiods (with rm-subperiod xed effects). Again, the coef cients sharply reject the hypothesis that nancially constrained rms have greater investment-cash ow sensitivities. In Table VI , rms that are not constrained in a subperiod have an investment-cash ow sensitivity of 0.680. This is signi cantly greater than the sensitivity of 0.436 for all rm subperiods and greater than the sensitivity of rms that are possibly constrained (at 0.259) or likely constrained (at 0.274).
Table VI also presents regression results for the fteen rmsubperiods for which we classify the rm as NFC in every year in the subperiod. 13 Ten of the fteen subperiods fall in the 1978-1984 period during which even FHP argue the sample rms were less likely to be constrained. Strikingly, the investment-cash ow sensitivity for these fteen subperiods of 0.779 exceeds any of the coef cients for any group of rms we present in Tables VI and VII. Based on our classi cation scheme and the quantitative support for that scheme in Tables III and IV , we nd it impossible to argue that these rms were unable to invest more during any of these fteen subperiods. We also nd it dif cult to argue that these rms faced a particularly high cost of external nance. Hewlett-Packard, for example, is included among these fteen subperiods in 1978-1984 (although not in 1970-1977) . And Hewlett-Packard has an investment-cash ow sensitivity of 0.97 over the 1978-1984 subperiod, 0.91 over the 1970-1977 subperiod, and 1.15 over the entire sample period. It is worth stressing that the fteen rms that are NFC in every subperiod year have nancial characteristics that are similar to those of FHP's Class 3 rms that pay high dividends and have a low investment-cash ow sensitivity (0.23). For example, the NFC rms and FHP's Class 3 rms have interest coverage ratios that are economically 13. We do not create this classi cation over the entire sample period because we classify only two rms as NFC in all fteen years. Table I . Sample is divided into two subperiods, 1970-1977 and 1978-1984 . Firm nancial constraint status is determined within each subperiod. Fifty-seven rm-subperiods are never nancially constrained (NFC or LNFC every year), 14 rm-subperiods are possibly nancially constrained (PFC in some year), 27 rm-subperiods are likely nancially constrained (LFC or FC in some year), and 15 rmsubperiods are NFC every year. Overall subperiod status is based on rm nancing constraint status for each year of not nancially constrained (NFC), likely not nancially constrained (LNFC), possibly nancially constrained (PFC), likely nancially constrained (LFC), and nancially constrained (FC). Regressions include rm xed effects for each subperiod, resulting in up to 98 rm-period xed effects, and year effects. Standard errors are in brackets. Table I . Sample is divided into two subperiods, 1970-1977 and 1978-1984 . Firm nancing constraint status is determined within each subperiod. Fifty-seven rm-subperiods are never nancially constrained (NFC or LNFC every year), 14 rm-subperiods are possibly nancially constrained (PFC in some year), 27 rm-subperiods are likely nancially constrained (LFC or FC in some year), and 15 rmsubperiods are NFC every year. Overall subperiod status is based on rm nancing constraint status for each year of not nancially constrained ( and statistically indistinguishable. It seems dif cult to understand how one set of rms can be constrained while the other is not. Table VII presents results for each of the two subperiods separately. Again, we nd no evidence that nancing constraints explain the sensitivity of investment to cash ow. In both subperiods the rms that we classify as NFC every year and as never constrained have a signi cantly higher investment-cash ow sensitivity than the other groups of rms. Furthermore, in the 1978-1984 period where we are more certain of our classi cations, the sensitivity declines monotonically with the extent to which we classify rms as constrained.
B. Quantitative De nitions of Financially Constrained Status
Given the results in the previous section, some readers may be concerned that we have misclassi ed rms by using qualitative data. (For example, see FHP [1996] .) To address this concern, we report the results of grouping rms based on quantitative/objective data.
In regressions (1)- (3) of Table VIII , we present estimates of the investment-cash ow sensitivities for (i) the 25 percent of sample rms whose interest coverage never drops below 2.5 and (ii) rms whose dividends are never restricted over the entire sample period. Given the two severe recessions over the sample period, these criteria should identify rms that were relatively nancially healthy. The investment-cash ow sensitivity for the thirteen rms whose coverage never drops below 2.5 is signicantly greater at 0.673 than the sensitivity of 0.395 for the entire sample. The investment-cash ow sensitivity for the seventeen rms whose dividends are never restricted at 0.435 also exceeds the sensitivity for the entire sample, although not signi cantly.
In regressions (4)- (6) we split the sample into subperiods as we did in Table VI . We present estimates of the investment-cash ow sensitivities for (i) the 25 percent of rm-subperiods whose interest coverage never drops below 4.5 in the subperiod, and (ii) rms whose dividends are never restricted over the subperiod. The patterns are qualitatively similar and quantitatively stronger than those for the entire sample period. The investmentcash ow sensitivity for the 21 rms whose coverage never drops below 4.5 in a subperiod is a remarkably high 0.801. We should point out that the median interest coverage for rms rated BBB by Standard & Poor's in 1979-1981 was 3.82; the median for Tables I and III. Regressions (1)- (3) are estimated for total sample and by (i) whether rms ever had interest coverage below 2.5; and (ii) rms are not explicitly restricted from paying dividends over the entire sample period. Interest coverage is the ratio of EBITDA to interest expense. Regressions (4)-(6) are estimated using rm nancial status over sample subperiods 1970-1977 and 1978-1984 . Regressions (1)-(3) include rm xed effects and year effects. Regressions (4)- (6) rms rated A was 6.56. In other words, these rms are not likely to have faced particularly high costs of external nance in absolute terms in the subperiods. More importantly, in relative terms it is virtually certain that they faced lower costs of externalnance than the other rms in our sample and, yet, show a higher investment-cash ow sensitivity.
C. Predetermined Classi cation of Financially Constrained Status
One important potential criticism of our results is that our use of nancial status over the entire period (or subperiod) may "hardwire" our results. Firms that only increase investment when they have the cash ow to do so will exhibit a high investment-cash ow sensitivity and will be less likely to become constrained subsequently. In contrast, rms that increase investment when they do not have cash ow will exhibit a low sensitivity and will be more likely to become constrained later (if they nance some of the investment with debt). It is possible, therefore, that the investment-cash ow sensitivities we have estimated re ect the way investment was nanced, and that this drives our overall measure of nancial status rather than vice versa.
Although it is fairly standard in this literature to sort rms according to within-sample characteristics (for example, FHP [1988] , Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [1991] , and Lamont [1996] ), this approach has received an increasing number of criticisms (see Schiantarelli [1995] ). To address this concern, we use a de nition of nancial status that re ects only past (not future) information. Speci cally, we measure rm nancial status based on the previous year's nancial status. This should isolate the effect of nancial status, rather than possibly re ecting the way in which investment was nanced. In other words, we believe that this speci cation is the most appropriate one to use to test for the effect of nancing constraints on investment-cash ow sensitivities.
In regression (1) of Table IX we present differential estimates of the investment-cash ow sensitivities by interacting cash ow with predetermined annual measures of nancing-constraint status.
14 We use four nancing constraint dummies: LNFC equals 14. Our results are qualitatively identical when we also include dummy variables for the intercept term. (1) and (2) use nancial constraint status at the beginning of the scal year (based on status at the end of the previous scal year). Regression (3) interacts cash ow with a dummy variable that equals one if a rm's covenants restrict it from paying dividends in the previous scal year. Regression (4) interacts cash ow with a dummy variable that equals one if a rm's slack in the previous scal year is in the lowest quartile of rm-years (less than 0.28 of net property, plant, and equipment). Slack is the sum of cash and unused line of credit. Regressions include rm xed effects and year effects. Standard errors are in brackets. one if the rm is likely not nancially constrained in the previous scal year; PFC, if the rm is possibly nancially constrained that year; LFC, if the rm is likely nancially constrained that year; and FC, if the rm is de nitely nancially constrained that year. The base or constant term measures investment in NFC rm-years. We stress that this classi cation scheme uses only information available at the beginning of the scal year. The results are qualitatively identical to those in the previous sections. The investment-cash ow sensitivities are signi cantly lower for FC, LFC, and PFC rm-years than for LNFC and NFC rmyears. The results are qualitatively identical if FC and LFC rmyears and LNFC and NFC rm-years are classi ed together.
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Although we prefer the above method because it fully uses the annual information on each rm's nancial status, we also tried an alternative approach that is somewhat more consistent with the previous literature. (These results are not reported in a table.) For each year from 1970 to 1977, we divided the sample into two groups depending on whether the rm was classi ed as unconstrained (NFC and LFNC) or constrained (LFC and FC) in that year. We then used the following seven years to estimate separate sensitivity coef cients for the two groups. In all eight paired regressions, the estimated investment-cash ow sensitivity of the unconstrained rms is higher than that of the constrained rms. In ve of the eight regressions this difference is statistically signi cant.
These ndings con rm our previous empirical results and support our theoretical claim that investment-cash ow sensitivity is not necessarily increasing in the degree of nancing constraints. The one remaining question, perhaps, is our measure of nancing constraints. Fortunately, the simple model we presented in Section I provides a way to test the reliability of our indicators. Equation (3) makes the unequivocal theoretical prediction that, ceteris paribus, investment should decrease in the degree ofnancing constraints. By looking at the relation of our annualnancing constraint measures to investment, we can assess the validity of those measures. We do this by introducing our annual nancing constraint indicators in a standard Q model of investment (and controlling for xed rm and year effects). This test is not possible in the earlier regressions because overall nancing constraint status is collinear with rm xed effects.
The results are reported in regression (2) of Table IX . Controlling for Q, investment levels decline monotonically in the de-gree of nancing constraints. For example, investment after LFC rm-years is 2 0.17 lower than after NFC rm-years. The results are strongly consistent with the predictions derived in equation (3). They also suggest that our lagged measure of nancing constraints successfully captures the degree of nancing constraint.
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In regressions (3) and (4) we repeat the analysis in regression (1), but instead use quantitative measures of nancial status, again, based on the previous year's results. In regression (3) we interact cash ow with a dummy variable that equals one when debt covenants restrict the rm from paying dividends. Again, we nd that the investment-cash ow sensitivity is signi cantly lower, not higher, for rms restricted from paying dividends. In regression (4) we interact cash ow with a dummy variable that equals one if in the previous rm-year our slack variable-the sum of cash and unused lines of credit as a fraction of capitalis in the lowest quartile of rm-years. The low slack cutoff is 28 percent of beginning-of-year capital (net property, plant, and equipment). Our results are not sensitive to this cutoff. It seems reasonable to assume that rms with less slack are more nancially constrained than rms with more slack. Again, we nd that the investment-cash ow sensitivity is lower, not higher, for rms with low slack.
Overall, then, we obtain qualitatively identical results using both qualitative and quantitative measures of nancing constraints that are predetermined.
D. Sensitivity to Cash Stock
Although most of the literature focuses on the sensitivity of investment to cash ow, some authors (e.g., Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein [1994] ) focus on the sensitivity of investment to the cash stock (cash and marketable securities) that a rm has available at the beginning of the year. For completeness, in Table X we reestimate the annual nancing constraint regressions in Table IX using this alternative measure of liquidity. (The results we report are qualitatively identical when we instrument cash holdings with its lagged value.)
In the regression in column (1) we measure liquidity as cash 15 . These results are also interesting for the debate on the relationship between investment and Q in nancially constrained rms. Chirinko [1995] argues that the effects of nancing constraints will be fully re ected in a rm's market value and, thus, on its Q. To the contrary, our results suggest that Q is not sufcient to explain the investment of nancially constrained rms. Tables I and III. Firm nancing constraint status for each year is not nancially constrained (NFC), likely not nancially constrained (LNFC), possibly nancially constrained (PFC), likely nancially constrained (LFC), or nancially constrained (FC). The noninteracted cash ow variable represents years in which rms are NFC. Regressions include rm xed effects and year effects. Standard errors are in brackets.
(2) stock de ated by net property plant and equipment, both at the beginning of the year. The regression estimates the sensitivity of investment to cash stock as a function of a rm's nancial status. Our ndings are qualitatively identical to those in Table IX : the least constrained rms show the highest sensitivity.
In column (2) we include both measures of liquidity: cash ow and cash stock. The sensitivity of investment to cash ow decreases with the degree of nancing constraints-the same pattern encountered throughout the paper. In contrast, the sensitivity of investment to cash stock now increases with the degree of nancing constraints. These latter results, however, are not statistically signi cant; none of the coef cients are statistically different from each other.
These results may raise the question of which sensitivity is the relevant one. The theory, however, does not distinguish between cash ow and cash stock: the effect of an extra dollar of funds should be the same, independent of whether it enters the rm this period (as cash ow) or whether it was present in the rm at the beginning of the period (as cash stock). For this reason, we estimate a regression in column (3) of Table X that measures liquidity as the sum of cash ow and cash stock. Our main nding is con rmed: the least constrained rms show a signicantly higher sensitivity of investment to internal funds.
We also estimated (but do not report in a table) the regressions in Tables V and VII with cash stock and cash ow. In all regressions, our basic nding holds: investment-cash ow sensitivities decrease signi cantly with the degree of nancing constraints. The results for investment-cash stock sensitivities are mixed. Over the entire sample period, investment-cash stock sensitivities increase signi cantly with the degree of nancing constraints. However, this pattern does not hold for either the 1970-1977 or the 1978-1984 subperiod.
E. Alternative Speci cations
We considered, but do not report, a number of alternative speci cations of our basic regressions. (1) We removed Q as an independent variable leaving cash ow as the only independent variable. (2) We added the ratio of sales to capital as an independent variable with Q and cash ow to capital. (3) We included two lags of cash ow and Q as independent variables. (4) To reduce the in uence of outliers, we: (i) winsorized investment, cash ow, and Q; (ii) de ated investment and cash ow by total assets rather than by capital; (iii) eliminated observations with negative cash ow; and (iv) measured cash ow using EBITDA. (5) We ran regressions for each rm individually. (6) We checked whether the results hold if we exclude any particular rm from the sample. Our results are qualitatively and statistically identical under all of these alternatives. These speci cations and results, therefore, address the concerns raised by FHP [1996] that our empirical results could be the artifact of a censored regression. 16 We also tested the robustness of our results with respect to different de nitions of investment. Besides the standard de nition (COMPUSTAT item 128), we used the following: (1) COMPUSTAT item 30, which includes increases in property, plant, and equipment from acquisitions that use purchase accounting; (2) change in net property, plant, and equipment; (3) change in net property, plant, and equipment adding back depreciation; and (4) the sum of capital expenditures and research and development. All four adjustments yield results that are qualitatively and statistically identical to our basic results. Finally, we estimated inventory regressions similar to those estimated by Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen [1995] . Again, we nd no evidence that the sensitivity of inventory investment to cash ow increases with nancing constraints.
V. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The results indicate that a high sensitivity of investment to cash ow is not associated with nancially constrained rms in our sample. This contrasts with the results in FHP [1988] and many subsequent papers. This section argues in greater detail that our ndings are not speci c to our sample, but, instead, likely capture general features of the relationship between corporate investment and cash ow. Section VI discusses the implications of these ndings for the previous literature.
A. Cash Flow as a Proxy for Investment Opportunities?
One possible criticism is that our sorting criteria are correlated with the mismeasurement of Q and that this effect overcomes the effect of nancing constraints (which go in the opposite direction). This criticism was rst made in Poterba's [1988] discussion of FHP [1988] . Poterba points out that if cash ow provides more information about future investment opportunities for certain groups of rms (like nondividend paying rms), such rms on average would have a greater investment-cash ow sen-16. In fact, we believe it is telling that FHP [1996] criticize our results hypothetically, rather than by showing that the criticisms hold in the data. sitivity, independent of their nancial status. FHP [1996] present a similar criticism of our results.
In the literature following FHP [1988] , this measurement problem has been addressed by using the so-called Euler equation approach (see Whited [1992] ; Bond and Meghir [1994]; and Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited [1995] ). This approach directly tests the rst-order conditions of an intertemporal maximization problem that does not require a measurement of Q and, therefore, is (supposedly) unaffected by Q's mismeasurement.
To test the robustness of our ndings, we followed the Euler equation approach developed in Bond and Meghir [1994] , who explicitly model the wedge between internal and external nance. Their empirical implementation involves regressing investment on lagged investment and its square, sales, cash ow, and debt squared, and testing whether the coef cient on cash ow is different across rms with different dividend policies. When we implement this approach, we obtain results qualitatively identical to those from our basic speci cation. Our least constrained rms exhibit the highest coef cients.
In sum, the Euler equation approach provides no evidence that our ndings are driven by mismeasurement of Q. (The alternative interpretation-that the Euler equation approach fails to control for differences in investment opportunities -would call into question all the results in the literature derived using that methodology.)
B. The Impact of Outliers
The papers in this literature typically de ate all the variables by the value of capital (net property, plant, and equipment) at the beginning of the scal year. This method provides consistent estimates if all variables are recorded at short intervals or if there is no growth. In practice, however, neither of the two assumptions is satis ed. Variables are recorded at annual intervals, and companies grow substantially over the sample period: a median of 18 percent per year for our sample. If both investment and cash ow grow at a rate similar to the growth rate of sales, then part of the comovement of investment and cash ow may be due to a scale factor. This effect would bias the estimates of the investment-cash ow sensitivity toward one, particularly in rms with higher annual growth rates.
To account for this possibility, we estimate regressions that eliminate or downweight observations with high growth rates. The rst four columns of Table XI report the results of regressions that exclude rm-years with more than 30 percent sales growth (the upper quartile). When we eliminate these observations, the median rate of sales growth for the constrained, possibly constrained, and not constrained rms is essentially equal (between 11 percent and 12 percent). The investment-cash ow sensitivities decline substantially. Nevertheless, the pattern across the three groups of rms remains qualitatively the same, and the difference in sensitivities is still statistically signi cant. The second four columns of Table XI report qualitatively similar results when we eliminate rm-years in which net property, plant, and equipment more than doubled. 17 Finally, we obtain qualitatively and statistically similar results (in unreported regressions) when we apply a robust estimation technique that downweights outliers.
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In sum, our cross-sectional results are not driven by outliers. The same cannot be said for the overall results in FHP [1988] . Eliminating or downweighting high growth rm-years reduces the estimated investment-cash ow sensitivity of the entire low dividend payout sample to between 0.20 and 0.25. This is effectively identical to the estimate of 0.23 obtained by FHP for their unconstrained, high payout rms. Given that these rms are less likely to experience such extreme growth rates, these results indicate that FHP's overall ndings (across payout classes) are at least partially driven by extreme observations. Unfortunately, this problem is not likely to be restricted to FHP [1988] . Any splitting criterion that sorts rms into subsamples with differential outliers in growth rates-for example, splits on size and dividend payout ratios-may be biased toward nding a difference in coef cients on cash ow. This bias may partially account for the large body of evidence nding a higher investment-cash ow sensitivity in fast growing companies, that tend to be classi ed as nancially constrained.
17. Following a suggestion of David Scharfstein, we investigated all the observations where property, plant, and equipment more than doubled in a single year. In most of these cases the increase in investment appears to have been driven by a sudden surge in both the demand for the rm's product and rm pro ts.
18. This method, implemented by STATA, performs an initial screening to eliminate gross outliers prior to calculating starting values and then performs, as suggested by Li [1985] , Huber iterations followed by biweight iterations. The results are available upon request. Table I 
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C. Financially Constrained Equals Financially Distressed?
It is plausible that nancially distressed rms will exhibit low investment-cash ow sensitivities. For example, an insolvent rm might be forced by its creditors to use additional cash ow to repay debt rather than for capital expenditures. This necessarily will reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash ow. If the rms we classify as constrained and possibly constrained are, in fact, nancially distressed, this would reduce the generality and impact of our results.
Tables III and XII, however, refute this argument. Table III presents rm characteristics by rm-year nancial status; Table  XII presents rm characteristics by overall sample nancial status. First, the bottom of Table III indicates that rms increase their debt, rather than repay it in the years we classify them as possibly, likely, or de nitely constrained. Second, although one might argue that the de nitely constrained rm-years are distressed (median interest coverage of 1.09), Table III shows that this is not likely to be the case for the likely constrained rmyears (median interest coverage of 2.84) and de nitely not the case for the possibly constrained rm-years (median interest coverage of 4.20). Third, Table XII shows that over the entire sample period, rms we classify as possibly constrained are approximately as healthy as rms we classify as never constrained. Finally, it is unreasonable to describe the likely constrained rms as distressed over the entire sample period (median interest coverage of 4.84), despite the fact that they are less healthy overall than the other two groups. In fact, FHP [1988] intended to eliminate distressed rms because they explicitly excluded rms with overall negative real sales growth from their sample.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVIOUS WORK
The discussion above suggests that our ndings are not caused by econometric problems or an inappropriate classi cation scheme. In our sample there is a negative, rather than positive, correlation between investment-cash ow sensitivities and the degree of nancing constraints. This shows that a nonmonotonic relationship (or even an inverse relationship) is not only theoretically possible, but is also empirically relevant. Only future work will be able to ascertain how pervasive this nonmonotonicity is. However, our paper shows that monotonicity cannot be taken for granted. nancially constrained (LFC), and nancially constrained (FC). For the entire period, 19 rms are never nancially constrained over the entire period (NFC or LNFC in every year), 8 rms are possibly nancially constrained at some time (PFC in some year), and 22 rms are likely nancially constrained at some time in the period (LFC or FC). Each entry reports the median and number of observations. Investment (I t ), cash ow, Q, and capital (K t2 1 ) are de ned in Table I . Interest coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA) to interest expense. Debt is the sum of the book value of short-term and long-term debt. Total capital is the sum of debt, the book value of preferred stock, and the book value of common equity. Free divs. is the amount of retained earnings that are not restricted from being paid out as dividends. Cash is cash and marketable securities. Unused line t is the amount of unused line of credit at the end of year t. Slack is the sum of cash and unused line. One might argue that we have only raised a possibility, and that our ndings do not generalize beyond the speci c FHP [1988] sample. In fact, FHP [1996] -citing the large body of evidence which nds that an increased sensitivity is associated with a priori measures of nancing constraints-dismiss our results as little more than an empirical counterexample.
The existing literature, however, cannot be brought in as evidence against our results for two reasons. First, it is likely that a publication selection bias exists in this literature. Because the null hypothesis before FHP [1988] was that nancing constraints did not matter, only papers showing otherwise were likely to be written and published. (See De Long and Lang [1992] .)
More importantly (and ignoring the possible publication bias), the existing evidence can be used to support the monotonicity assumption only if the theoretical priors used in those studies unequivocally identify those rms as more likely to be constrained. If this were the case, then the fact that most studies nd a higher sensitivity for rms more likely to be constrained may be interpreted in favor of a monotonic relation between sensitivities and nancing constraints. However, if the priors are ambiguous (and monotonicity cannot be taken for granted), then the argument is invalid, and the interpretation of many of the results in this literature becomes questionable: high sensitivities, per se, cannot be taken as evidence of nancing constraints. In our view, most of the sorting criteria used in this literature are, indeed, theoretically ambiguous. Consider, for example, one of the better known papers in this literature: Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [1991] , which divides Japanese rms on the basis of whether they belong to a keiretsu and, therefore, to a large extent of whether they have a main-bank relationship. Although it is easy to argue that such a relationship will have an effect on a rm's nancing and investment policy, it is much less clear, on a priori grounds, what the sign of this effect should be. Some theories (e.g., Myers and Majluf [1984] ) imply a positive role for a main-bank relationship in reducing informational asymmetries and, thus, in alleviating nancing constraints. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein nd that Japanese rms with an exclusive bank relationship have a lower investment-cash ow sensitivity. By stressing these theories, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein interpret their ndings as evidence that a main-bank relationship makes rms less constrained.
In contrast, other theories (e.g., Sharpe [1990] and Rajan [1991] ) imply that banks can exploit an exclusive main-bank relationship and charge client rms a higher cost of capital (i.e., make them more nancially constrained). The nding in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [1993] that the healthiest Japanese rms (from their original sample) subsequently broke their exclusive bank relationships is consistent with this interpretation. Houston and James [1995] nd that U. S. rms with an exclusive bank relationship have a higher investment-cash ow sensitivity. By stressing these other theories, Houston and James interpret this as evidence that a main-bank relationship makes these rms more, not less, constrained.
The theoretical ambiguity is not unique to Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [1991] and Houston and James [1995] , but is shared by most of the splitting criteria used in this literature. Firms with a lower-than-average leverage are sometimes interpreted, a priori, as relatively unconstrained rms (e.g., Whited [1992] ) because they retain a large debt capacity and can obtain external funds very easily. In other papers, rms with lowerthan-average leverage are considered to be relatively constrained (e.g., Calomiris and Himmelberg [1995] ) because they are assumed to maintain low leverage because the costs of being nancially constrained or distressed would be extremely high.
Similarly, rms with unusually high cash holdings are sometimes classi ed, a priori, as relatively unconstrained [Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994] because they can invest that cash. And sometimes rms with unusually high cash holdings are classi ed as relatively constrained [Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel 1995] because they are assumed to need to accumulate that cash as precautionary savings to avoid the high costs of being nancially constrained or distressed in the future.
In sum, the theoretical priors are ambiguous. As a result, our ndings are not a minor counterexample in a large literature that nds otherwise. Rather this is the rst paper to test the very assumption upon which the literature is based.
19
VII. CONCLUSION Our analysis indicates that the investment-cash ow sensitivity criterion as a measure of nancing constraints is not wellgrounded in theory and is not supported by empirical evidence in the case we investigate. While we believe that the nonmonotonicity problem we have documented is pervasive and affects many of the results in this literature, future research will be needed to con rm this hypothesis.
19. Our methodology is not subject to the same criticisms for two reasons. First, we classify rm nancing constraint status using direct observation rather than theoretical priors. Second, we con rm the quality of our nancing constraint indicators using a test for which the theory is unequivocal.
If the nonmonotonicity result is general, then it will be important to understand its source. One explanation (implicitly assumed in our theoretical model) involves understanding the shape of the cost function of raising external nance where external nance is costly because of information or agency problems. Alternatively, it is possible that the nonmonotonic behavior of the investment-cash ow sensitivity is driven by a mischaracterization of the reasons why rms are reluctant to raise externalnance. The most nancially successful and least constrained rms in our sample appear to rely primarily on internal cash ow to invest despite the availability of additional low cost funds and, therefore, exhibit a high investment-cash ow sensitivity. The key question-that we do not answer-is why we observe this behavior. It seems important that future work attempt to distinguish among these explanations because of their disparate policy implications for institutional and incentive design.
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